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I.

INTRODUCTION

New accounting rules being phased in between 2006 and 2008
will require state and local governments, for the first time, to
report the full cost of public retiree health benefits ("PRHBs") for
both current employees and retirees.1 This new rule brings retiree
health benefits in line with rules governing both public pensions
and private sector rules governing both pensions and retiree
health benefits. 2 This article assesses the potential impact of
these new accounting rules on the vesting, modification, and
especially the financing of public retiree health benefits.

1. Gov't Accounting Standards Bd., Accounting and Financial Reporting
by Employers for Postemployment Benefits Other Than Pensions, No.45 (June
2004) [hereinafter GAS 45].
The new accounting standards are being
implemented in three phases, depending on the size of the government body.
Id. First, the new standards took effect on December 16, 2006 for phase one
governments (annual revenue of $100 million and above). Id. Second, phase
two governments (annual revenue between $10 and $100 million), were
required to comply by December 15, 2007. Id. Finally, phase three
governments (annual revenues less than $10 million), have until December 15,
2008 to implement the new standards. Id.
2. Stan Wisniewski & Lorel Wisniewski, State Government Retiree Health
Benefits: Current Status and Potential Impact of New Accounting Standards,
AARP
1,
July
2004,
available
at
http://www.aarp.org
/researcb/work/benefits/aresearch-import-883-2004-08.html.
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The fifty states will owe $2.7 trillion over the next thirty
years for PRHBs. 3 Demographic concerns, such as an aging
population, and economic concerns, such as the rapidly rising cost
of health care, were already pressuring public employers to cut
benefits or scramble for more funding. The new accounting rules
will expose this enormous unfunded liability hanging over public
employers for all to see, and exacerbate the existing pressures.
Part II provides an overview of the current state of PRHBs by
comparing them to pensions, exploring the sources of law
governing them, and examining the new accounting rules and
their likely impact on PRHBs. Part III outlines the wide array of
legal doctrines courts invoke in assessing whether PRHBs have
vested, including: presumptions for or against vesting, extrinsic
evidence, the doctrine of estoppel, and interest arbitration. Part
IV surveys cases addressing when employers can modify vested
PRHBs. Three rough categories emerge: reasonable modifications
under Contract Clause analysis, denial of modifications without
consent, absent unanticipated circumstances, or modification
allowed where benefits remain substantially equal. Part V looks
at current PRHB financing and likely future choices in light of the
new accounting rules. Innovative funding tools will be explored,
including voluntary employees beneficiary associations (VEBAs)
and Internal Revenue Code § 401(h) accounts.
II.

OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC RETIREE
HEALTH BENEFITS (PRHBs)

A. Generally
As stated, the states are facing a $2.7 trillion bill over the
next thirty years to fund their PRHBs. 4 States vary in the
amounts they owe, depending on how generous they are when it
comes to paying for PRHBs. 5 For example, Maryland faces high
liability, $14.5 billion, compared with $2.3 billion that Virginia
owes, largely thanks to the fact that Maryland is more generous to
its retirees than Virginia.6 In fiscal year 2001 alone, states'
7
spending on PRHBs amounted to $4.4 billion.

3. Mary Williams Walsh, Pension Fund Shortages Create Hard Choices,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2007, at C1.
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. Kristin Downey, Study Sizes Up States' Substantial Retiree Benefit
Costs, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2007, at A4. Virginia's costs are less than
Maryland's in part because in Virginia, retirees are given only a cash subsidy
so that they can purchase health insurance. Id.
7. Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at 12.
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While there is no legal requirement for public employers to
adopt and maintain retiree health plans, all fifty states voluntarily
provide health insurance coverage for state employees. 8 Unlike
the private sector, where retiree health benefits have been cut
back or eliminated altogether, public employers express deep
reluctance to touch PRHBs.9 The amount of coverage provided
varies from state to state, however, because it depends on who is
eligible to enroll and the portion paid by the state employer and by
the individual employee. 10 Altogether, "states provide coverage for
about 3.4 million state government employees and retirees," and
"74% of part-time state employees [have] the option of electing
health benefits (as compared to 48% nationally)."1 2 In 2006,
sixteen states paid one hundred percent of monthly premiums1 3
while only five states paid one hundred percent of the monthly
premiums for families of state employees.1 4 "State and local
governments continue to offer retiree health benefits at a higher
15
rate than any other industry."
A number of factors, however, are increasing pressure on
public employers to reduce their PRHB costs. There is the
impending retirement of the seventy-nine million baby boomers
born between 1946 and 1964, which will make it difficult for state
and local governments to keep up with the cost of retiree medical
8. Id. at 10.

Although two states, Indiana and Nebraska, end health

benefits at age sixty-five. Id. The contributions, however, are by no means
equal. Id. Wisconsin, for example, only contributes to PHRBs by converting
accumulated sick leave into "retiree health insurance credits." Id.; see id. at v.
(noting that "[p]ublic employers are typically large employers and large
employers generally provide post-employment benefits programs"). Iowa and

Mississippi offer little or no PRHBs. Moody's Investor Service, Other PostEmployment Benefits (OPEB), 2005 MOODY'S SPECIAL REPORT No. 93649, at 4
[hereinafter MOODY'S SPECIAL REPORT]. While Wisconsin and Montana offer

PRHBs, these states require retirees to pay most of the cost. Id.
9. Center for Studying Health System Change, News Release, Public
Employee Health Benefits Weather Rising Costs and Tight Budgets, Apr. 18,
2006, http://hschange.org/CONTENT/834//

(last visited October 4,

2008)

[hereinafter Ctr. News Release]. Also, in contrast to trends in the private
sector, HMOs have remained very popular in the public sector. Id.
10. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Employee Health
Benefits, http://ncsl.org/programs/health/stateemploy.htm (last visited October
4, 2008) (listing various features of each state's health plans and providing a
link to the administrative agency responsible for each state's plan)
[hereinafter Health Benefits].

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Monthly premiums ranged from as little as $105 per month in
Indiana, to as much as $668 per month in Alaska. MOODY'S SPECIAL REPORT,

supra note 8, at 4.
14. Health Benefits, supra note 10. The five states are New Hampshire,

New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Oregon. Id.
15. Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at i.
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benefits. 16 Moreover, lengthening life expectancies, 17 the smaller
number of active employees compared to the growing number of
retirees,' 8 and increased incentives for public employees to retire
earlier, 19 add to the cost of PRHBs.
New federal accounting
standards in place starting in 2006,20 will also create financial
incentives for public employers to rein in the costs of PRHBs.21
The rising costs of health insurance is yet another reason public
employers are cutting back on retiree benefits. 22 Thirty-seven
states' plans faced double-digit premium growth in 2005, with
23
Wyoming facing the biggest increase of thirty-eight percent.
Health care premiums have been rising faster than inflation for
24
many years.
Already a number of cities and states have taken steps to
reduce their PRHB liabilities. For example, six states now charge
or authorize lower premiums to non-smoking state employees and
higher premiums for smokers. 25 Pennsylvania started requiring
new retirees to pay one percent of their salary for retiree health
benefits, 26 while West Virginia requires retirees to pay twenty

16. Health Benefits, supra note 10.
17. See Mike Stobbe, US Life Expectancy Tops 78 as Top Diseases Decline,
Assoc. PRESS, Jun. 11,
2008, available at http://bulletin.aarp.
org/yourhealth/healthyliving/articles/uslife-expectancy-tops
as-top-disease
s-decline.html (reporting that the average U.S. life expectancy continues to
rise).
18. Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at 22.
19. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. of Chisholm v. Norman, 696 N.W.2d 329,
333 (Minn. 2005) (holding that the main aim of a statutory amendment was to
authorize public employers to offer PRHBs to encourage highly compensated
employees to retire).
20. GAS 45, supra note 1.
21. See id. (providing a framework to tie future payments for retiree
benefits to the accounting period when those benefits accrued rather than
simply lumping payments together at the end of an employee's service in an
effort to make employers aware of how much they spend on each employee).
22. Kevin G. Hall, Prices Slam Middle Class, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 17, 2008,
at 3C (noting that the price of health insurance rose by 10.1% in 2007).
23. Health Benefits, supra note 10.
24. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-497T,
HEALTH CARE SPENDING: PUBLIC PAYERS FACE BURDEN OF ENTITLEMENT
PROGRAM GROWTH, WHILE ALL PAYEES FACE RISING PRICES AND INCREASING
USE OF SERVICES, 8, fig.6 (2007) (charting health care costs against general

inflation between 2000 and 2005); Vanessa Fuhrmans, Health-CarePremiums
Climbing Faster Than Inflation, Studies Say, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2007, at
D9 (reporting that health care costs rose twice as fast as inflation in 2007).
25. Health Benefits, supra note 10. The six states that charge smokers a
premium are Alabama, Indiana, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, and West
Virginia. Id.
26. Pamela M. Prah, Price Tag for State Retiree Benefits: $2.73 Trillion,
STATELINE,
Dec.
18,
2007,
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/
story?contentId=265697 (last visited October 4, 2008).
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27
dollars for specialists and fifty dollars for emergency room visits.
Another cost-saving measure entails raising the number of years
of employment required for eligibility for retiree health benefits.
For example, in 2006, North Carolina increased from five to
twenty years the time that new employees must work to qualify
for full benefits. 28 New Jersey and West Virginia have recently cut
education and health programs to fund future PRHBs. 29 In an
effort to save money, Utah changed its practice of providing
retirees a month of health insurance for every day of unused sick
pay. 30 Orlando, Florida and Arlington, Texas, have cut costs by
scaling back PRHBs for new employees. 31 While public employers
generally avoid shifting higher health costs to employees, some
workers have chosen to keep their generous benefits by forgoing

wage increases.

32

B. ComparingPRHBs and Public Retiree PensionBenefits
Besides PRHBs, all fifty states also offer public employees
pension benefits ("PRPBs"). 33 In most states, these two postemployment benefits are generally referred to as retirement
benefits, and both programs are commonly administered by the
same state agency. 34 What began historically as a reward for
retired military personnel 35 has, over the course of time, turned
into the most prized and costly benefit bestowed by public

employers.36

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Walsh, supra note 3, at C1.
30. MOODY'S SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.

31. Id.
32. Ctr. News Release, supra note 9. One of the drawbacks of generous
retiree health benefits, however, is that it decreases labor mobility. See
Thomas C. Buchmueller & Robert G. Valletta, The Effects of EmployerProvided Health Insurance on Worker Mobility, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
439, 453-54 (1996) (finding, empirically, that health benefits do create lower
worker mobility-"job lock"-and noting that the risk of not being insured
during the transition period from one job to another is the primary factor).
33. Ron Snell, Pension Tension: Very Few States Hold all the Assets they
Should for Future Retirement and Health Care Benefits, STATE LEGISLATURES,
May 2008, at 12.
34. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1156, STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT RETIREE BENEFITS, 3-4 (2007) [hereinafter GAO
RETIREE BENEFITS].
35. See Social Security Online, History, Pre-Social Security Period, 2003,
http://www.ssa.gov/historylbriefhistory3.html (recounting briefly the history of
pensions; noting the importance of Civil War pensions as a precursor to Social
Security) (last visited October 4, 2008).
36. Dennis Cauchon, State, Local Government Workers See Pay Gains, USA
http://www.usatoday
at
available
2008,
1,
Feb.
TODAY,
.comlnews/nation/2008-02-01-civil-servantsN.htm.
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While detailed treatment of public pension law is beyond the
scope of this article, it is useful to sketch a few key features of this
retirement benefit and describe how it relates, affects, overlaps,
and departs from PRHBs before proceeding to a discussion of how
PRHBs vest and can be modified. A pension has been defined as a
"payment following retirement from service." 37 At first, both
pensions and health insurance benefits were looked upon as
gratuities. 38 By the 1930s, however, public pensions at least were
considered as a form of deferred compensation. 39 In many states, a
public employee's right to pension benefits vests upon acceptance
of employment, subject only to reasonable changes by the
legislature. 4° The method of financing pension and PRHBs differs
in most states. While all states provide for advance funding of
pension benefits, 41 PRHBs are funded on a pay-as-you-go basis in
42
the vast majority of states.
Retirement plans in the United States fall into two groups,
defined benefit and defined contribution. 43 Most public employee
pension plans are defined benefit plans. 44 Under a defined benefit
plan, an eligible retiree receives a fixed percentage of her salary
multiplied by the number of years of service. 45 This benefit,

37. Warnhoff v. Warnhoff, 474 So. 2d 1224, 1226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
38. Id. Some states, like Missouri, continue to treat retirement benefits as
gratuities. See Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 2 v. City of St. Joseph, 8
S.W.3d 257, 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a pensioner has no vested
right in the continuance of a pension granted by public authorities because it
is not a contractual obligation but a gratuitous allowance, terminable at the
will of the grantor, either in whole or in part); see also Handy v. County of
Schoharie, 665 N.Y.S.2d 708, 709-10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that
benefits extended on the eve of retirement were a mere gratuity, revocable at
will); Chisholm, 696 N.W.2d at 339 (Anderson, J. concurring) (observing that
prior to the Minnesota Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Christensen,a public
retirement benefit was deemed merely a gratuity, a "bounty springing from
the graciousness and appreciation of sovereignty").
39. E.g., Malone v. Hayden, 197 A. 344, 353 n.10 (Pa. 1938) (holding that a
"contributor to a retirement fund has a fixed contractual status and vested
rights that cannot be destroyed").
40. E.g., Bates v. City of Richland, 51 P.3d 816, 821 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that pension rights are contractual in nature and vest at the start of
the employment relationship.)
41. Snell, supra note 33, at 12.
42. GAO RETIREE BENEFITS, supra note 34, at 4. Compare MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE PERS. & PENS. § 21-303 (2008) (requiring pre-funding for pensions),
with MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 2-503(a)(3) (detailing the pay-asyou-go method of PRHB funding.)
43. Paul Zorn, A Survey of State Retirement Systems Governing General
Employees and Teachers, GOVERNMENT FINANCE REVIEW, Oct. 1990, at 25.
44. Id.; see, e.g., Kan. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Koger Assocs.,
Inc., 941 P.2d 1321, 1330 (Kan. 1997) (describing the Kansas pension plan as
one of statutorily defined obligations that public employers must pay, making
the Kansas plan a classic, "defined benefit" pension plan).
45. Zorn, supra note 43, at 25. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 121.091 (2008)
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generally paid monthly, is guaranteed for the life of the
46
employee.
47
By contrast, a defined contribution plan has a fixed cost.
Under such plans, the employer and employee contribute a set
48
percentage of salary to the retirement fund each pay period.
Upon retirement, the employee is entitled to the total sum in the
retirement account. 49 While defined benefit plans do not set up
individual accounts, defined contribution plans do.5 ° If the retiree
exhausts the money in the defined contribution account, the
retiree's benefits run out. 51
In the 1990s, in light of dramatic stock market growth, a
number of states began offering defined contribution alternatives
to public employees in lieu of defined benefit plans. 52 This
transition from defined benefit to defined contribution pension
plans parallels a similar trend in the private sector. Between 2003
and 2005, 229 Fortune 1000 companies eliminated or froze their
defined benefit pension plans and switched to defined contribution
plans like 401(k)s. 53 The financial incentive for both public and
private employers to switch to defined contribution plans is that
they create a substantial actuarial gain over defined benefit plans,
thereby reducing the employer's liability.5 4 But the bursting of the
tech stock bubble in 2000-01 resulted in plunging 401(k) accounts,
leading at least one state to abolish its defined contribution system
in favor of a return to a defined benefit plan. 55 Setbacks in the
stock market also caused contribution rates for public defined
benefit plans to skyrocket. 56 Alaska reacted to steep contribution
(requiring the Florida Retirement System for public safety employees to grant
a pension equal to three percent of average final pay times the number of
years of credited service).
46. GAO RETIREE BENEFITS, supra 34, at 7.
47. Zorn, supra note 43, at 25.
48. Id.
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Pamela M. Prah, Accounting Rule Could Bust State Budgets,
http://www.stateline.org/live/
2006,
28,
June
details/story?contentId=123266 (last visited October 4, 2008) (reporting that
STATELINE,

Michigan and Alaska switched from a defined benefit to defined contribution,
401(k)-style plan); e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 121.4501 (2008) (amending the state
defined benefit retirement program to allow an employee-controlled defined

contribution plan).
53. Monica Hatcher, Ryder's Actions Mimic Trend, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 13,
2007, at C1.

54. Id.
55. 2002 Neb. Laws LB 687.
56. See, e.g., La. Mun. Ass'n v. State, 893 So. 2d 809, 818-19 (La. 2005)
(upholding state legislative act forcing the state to pay whatever contribution
was actuarially required to maintain the financial integrity of the retirement
system). As a result, the Louisiana Firefighters Retirement System employer
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increases by closing its entire public employee retirement system
in 2006; all employees hired after July 1, 2006, were forced into
57
defined contribution plans.
In the 1990s, many public employers started tapping their
state pension funds to help pay for PRHBs.58 With double-digit
increases in health care costs, however, some states are regretting
59
the drain.
C. ComparingSources of Law GoverningPrivate
and Public Sector Retiree Health Benefits
Unlike the public sector, where each state creates its own

retirement system largely unregulated by federal law, private
sector retirement benefits are regulated by the federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 60 and to a
lesser extent by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").61
Public retirement plans are expressly excluded from the scope of
ERISA.62 While a detailed description of ERISA is beyond the
scope of this article, a brief summary of its key features enriches
our understanding of PRHBs for at least two reasons: (1) some
government plans have been deemed to be private and so fall
within ERISA's orbit; 63 and (2) many courts assessing the vesting
and modification of PRHBs often look to ERISA and the case law
64
interpreting it for guidance.
All employee benefit plans governed by ERISA are subject to
minimum
standards,
such
as
reporting
and
disclosure

obligations, 65 fiduciary standards,

66

preemption of state law, 67 and

contribution increased from nineteen percent of payroll to nearly thirty-seven
percent of payroll in the four year period ending in fiscal year 2003. Id. at 853
n.122.
57. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.25.009-12 (2008) (establishing that Alaska's
Teachers' Defined Benefit Retirement Plan is only available to employees
hired before July 1, 2006); ALASKA STAT. § 14.25.320 (2008) (creating a defined
contribution plan for hires from Jul. 1, 2006 onward).
58. Mary Williams Walsh, Paying Health Care From Pension Proves Costly,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2006, at Al.
59. Id.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2006); Simac v. Health Alliance Med. Plans, Inc.,
961 F. Supp. 216, 217-18 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (recognizing the rule that ERISA does
not apply to "governmental plans").
63. E.g., ERISA Op. Ltr No. 79-62A (1979) (advising an Oklahoma teachers'
association that they would be subject to ERISA because they were an
employee welfare organization).
64. E.g., Davis v. Wilson County, 70 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tenn. 2002)
(analogizing to ERISA, Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that employees do not
automatically enjoy a vested interest in PRHBs).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
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remedies. 68
Pension plans, but not such benefits as health
insurance, are also subject to participation, vesting, accrual, and
69
funding regulations.
Private sector collective bargaining is shaped by the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),7 0 which expressly exempts public
Many state statutes framing public sector
employment. 7 1
collective bargaining, however, are modeled on the NLRA on such
matters as the exclusivity of union representation, 72 and in
defining unfair labor practices.7 3 While the NLRA and case law
interpreting it have been highly influential on courts assessing
public sector labor relations, there are some noteworthy
differences, including one area dealing with retirees that bear on
PRHBs.
In Allied Chemical & Alkili Workers, Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass,74 the Supreme Court ruled that under the NLRA,
75
retiree benefits are not a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Therefore, a unilateral change in retiree benefits is not an unfair
labor practice.7 6 By contrast, even though Minnesota's public
sector labor relations act is largely modeled on the NLRA, it
formerly treated public retiree benefits as a mandatory subject of
bargaining.7 7 Whether or not retiree benefits are subject to
mandatory bargaining bears on whether public employers may
unilaterally modify retiree benefits after an impasse in contract
negotiations is reached.78 The lesson to be drawn from these

68. See 29 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006) (providing criminal penalties for willful
ERISA violations); 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2006) (empowering civil actions for

ERISA violations).
69. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S.
(confirming that ERISA does not establish any minimum
vesting, or funding requirements for welfare plans, including
benefits, as it does for pension plans).
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006).
72. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006) (establishing

73, 78 (1995)
participation,
retiree health

the exclusive

representation rule under the NLRA), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1306

(2008) (making it an unfair labor practice in Delaware to refuse to bargain
with the employees' exclusive representative); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-8(a)
(2007) (granting the employees' exclusive representative the right to bargain
on behalf of employees in Hawaii); MINN. STAT. § 179A.12 (2008) (proscribing
that certified employee organizations in Minnesota will be the exclusive
representative of their members).
73. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006) (enacting into federal law a list of
"unfair labor practices"), with VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 961-62 (2008) (defining
employer unfair labor practices terms similar to the NLRA).
74. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
75. Id. at 182.
76. Id. at 185.
77. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc. v. County of Mower, 469 N.W.2d
496, 501 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 483 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2002).
78. Id.
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examples is to caution courts assessing PRHB issues from overreliance on analogies drawn from ERISA and the NLRA.
There are three sources of law that bear on public sector
PRHBs that have no private-sector counterparts. There is the
Contract Clauses found in the United States 79 and most state
constitutions,80 reliance on interest arbitration8 l when parties
reach an impasse during negotiations over a collective bargaining
agreement ("CBA"), and the "ultra vires"8 2 doctrine.
Constitutional Contract Clause analysis, a common legal
basis for challenging modifications to PRHBs but unavailable in
the private sector,8 3 inquires whether legislative action creates a
contractual obligation.8 4 While there is a strong presumption that
statutes do not create contractual rights,8 5 "a statute is itself
treated as a contract when the language and circumstances evince
a legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature
enforceable against the state."8 6 Whether state action modifying
PRHBs is prohibited by the Contract Clause turns on whether the
impairment is reasonable and necessary to serve an important
87
public purpose.
In the public sector, under binding interest arbitration, the
terms of a CBA are forced on the public employer and union by an
88
outsider when the two parties reach an impasse in negotiations.
Interest arbitration governs only some public employees, usually

79. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (barring laws impairing the obligation
of contracts).
80. See Brian A. Schar, Note, Contract Clause Law Under State
Constitutions: A Model for Heightened Scrutiny, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 123,
129 n.32 (1997) (compiling a list of the thirty-nine state constitutions that
contain contract clauses).
81. See David Broderdorf, Overcoming the First Contract Hurdle: Finding a
Role for Mandatory Interest Arbitration in the Private Sector, 23 LAB. LAW.
323, 324 (2008) (explaining that "binding interest arbitration" in the public
sector is when a neutral arbitrator resolves a labor dispute by creating a new
contractual agreement).
82. Black's Law Dictionary defines "ultra vires" as: "[u]nauthorized; beyond
the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1559 (8th ed. 2004).
83. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (limiting the prohibition against the
impairment of contracts to state actors).
84. See, e.g., Colo. Springs Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Colo. Springs, 784 P.2d
766, 773 (Colo. 1989) (rejecting retired employees' contract claim disputing the
capping of health plan contributions because the city ordinance at issue did
not create private contractual rights).
85. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co.,
470 U.S. 451, 465-66 (1985).
86. United State Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1977).
87. Id. at 21.
88. Broderdorf, supra note 81, at 324; see, e.g., IOWA CODE § 20.3(7) (2001)
(defining impasse as "the failure of a public employer and the employee
organization to reach agreement in the course of negotiations").
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police officers and firefighters, who are not entitled to strike when
89
impasse is reached.
The use of interest arbitration to resolve PRHB disputes has
been in flux in Minnesota.90 Unlike the private sector governed by
the NLRA, where employers may effect unilateral changes, 91
Minnesota public employers formerly had to submit PRHB issues
to interest arbitration. 92
In 1992, however, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that 1988 statutory amendments meant that
public employers cannot be forced to submit to binding interest
arbitration when they reach an impasse after good faith
93
bargaining.
An ultra vires contract is one "which is not within the power
of a municipal corporation to make under any circumstances or for
any purpose."94 A contract that is merely the result of a defective
exercise of existing authority is not ultra vires."95 In a New Jersey
case, the court held that a public employee retirement system was
not estopped from denying retirement eligibility where there is "an
absolute and unambiguous statutory declaration which deprives
the agency of jurisdictional authority to award pension benefits
under the circumstances." 96 If a city's act is ultra vires in the
primary sense, the act is void ab initio and cannot be undone by
estoppel. 97 By contrast, however, if the city's act is merely an
irregular exercise of a basic power, not utterly beyond its
jurisdiction, it is ultra vires only in the secondary sense. 98 An act
ultra vires in the secondary sense is subject to ratification under
the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 99 Unfortunately, facts do not
always neatly line up with primary or secondary forms of ultra
vires.1 00

89. See, e.g., Fairbanks Police Dep't. Chapter, Alaska Public Employees
Ass'n v. City of Fairbanks, 920 P.2d 273, 276 (Alaska 1996) (upholding city's
refusal to pay police officers' benefits awarded by arbitrator because statute
requiring legislative approval of monetary terms applied to CBA's arising out
of binding interest arbitration).
90. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., 483 N.W.2d at 699.
91. Allied Chem. & Alkili Workers, Local No. 1, 404 U.S. at 182, 185.
92. Law Enforcement Labor Serus., Inc., 483 N.W.2d at 499. The Minnesota
Court of Appeals interpreted the 1988 amendments to subject PRHBs disputes
to interest arbitration. Id.
93. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., 483 N.W.2d at 701.
94. 10 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 29.10 (3d ed. 1999)
95. Id.
96. O'Neill v. N.J Dep't of the Treasury, Div. of Pensions, 428 A.2d 562, 563
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
97. Wood v. Borough of Wildwood Crest, 726 A.2d 310, 313-14 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1999).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 315.
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D. Federal Statutes That Govern Both
Public and PrivateRetiree Health Benefits
Federal statutes that bear on retiree health benefits both in
the private and public sectors include: the Internal Revenue Code
("IRC"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), the
Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and Medicare. Under
§§ 105 and 106 of the IRC, premiums paid by the employer and
employee for health insurance benefits are not taxable income.10 1
Under the ADEA1o2 and regulations interpreting the
ADEA,103 an older employee may not be forced to make greater
contributions than a younger worker in support of an employee
benefit plan. Despite this provision, an older worker's share of the
premium may rise with age so long as the proportion of the total
premium required to be paid by the participants does not increase
10 4
with age.
Nationally, there are about twelve million non-federal
Medicare beneficiaries receiving retiree health benefits from their
former employers.10 5
A recent controversy involving the
intersection of retiree health benefits, the ADEA, and Medicare,
was whether the employer could reduce or terminate health
benefits for retirees who are eligible for Medicare without violating
the ADEA.1o 6 In 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), which enforces the ADEA, voted three to
one to approve a rule that would allow employers to coordinate the
retiree health benefits with Medicare without violating the
ADEA.1° 7 In other words, the new EEOC dispensation allowed
employers to give Medicare-eligible retirees fewer health benefits
than retirees under age sixty-five without violating the ADEA.
Moreover, Medicare bridge plans that provide health benefits to
101. I.R.C. §§ 105-06 (2006).

In his 2007 State of the Union address,

President Bush proposed changes to the IRC whereby employer-provided
health insurance would be treated as taxable income. Address Before a Joint
Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 57 (Jan. 23, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/news/releases/2007/01/20070123-2.html. Instead, a standard deduction would
be provided: $15,000 for families; $7,500 for individuals. Id.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 623(i)(2) (2006).
103. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d)(4)(i) (2008).
104. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d)(4)(ii)(C) (2008).
105. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation News Release, Survey Finds

Businesses And Retirees Hit With Double-Digit Increases In Retiree Health
Costs In 2004, With Higher Premiums Likely In Future, Dec. 14, 2004,
available at www.kff.org/medicare/medl2l4O4nr.cfm. Retirees in Indiana and
Nebraska are no longer covered under the state's health plan after age sixty-

five and must obtain individual coverage elsewhere to supplement Medicare.
Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at 4.
106. Id. at 3. In 2003, forty-eight states (all but Indiana and Nebraska)
offered PRHBs to Medicare-eligible retirees. Id.
107. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(e) (2008).
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retirees too young for Medicare eligibility were also deemed not to
constitute age discrimination. 108 Similarly, the rule allows unions
to negotiate for health benefits that coordinate with Medicare.10 9
In sum, employers may provide supplemental health benefits for
Medicare-eligible retirees without having to prove that the
benefits are identical to any benefits provided to pre-Medicare
retirees. 11 0 Absent the EEOC rule, retiree health benefits would
become so expensive and complex that employers would likely
decide simply to eliminate or reduce the benefits they currently
provide. Under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
("OWBPA") amendments to the ADEA,111 a retiree's severance
payments may be offset by the costs of the retiree's health
benefits. In the wake of federal legislation extending prescription
drug coverage under Medicare Part D,112 states like Maryland
have set up prescription drug benefit plans for Medicare-eligible
113
retirees.
On June 19, 2008, the Supreme Court decided Kentucky
Retirement Systems v. EEOC,1 14 a case involving the intersection
of the ADEA and public pension plans. Hazardous duty workers
under age fifty-five, the age of retirement eligibility in Kentucky, if
forced to retire owing to a disability, are entitled to more generous
benefits than disabled hazardous duty workers over age fiftyfive.llS The Supreme Court held that the ADEA and OWBPA
permit differential treatment of fringe benefits when it is not
motivated by age. 116 While strictly speaking the case narrowly
involves public pension plans, any decision is likely to influence all
public employment retirement benefits, including health benefits
that offer different benefits packages for different age groups.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 1511, 104 Stat. 978 (1990).
112. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. 108-173 (Dec. 8, 2003).
113. See 90 MD. OP. AT'Y. GEN. 195, 199 (2005) (reporting that the
Maryland General Assembly directed the state's retirement program to
include a prescription drug benefit) [hereinafter "MD. ATT'Y GEN."].
114. 128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008).
115. Id. at 2364.
116. Id. at 2369. The Court held that Kentucky's differential treatment of
workers of different ages was motivated by pension status rather than age,
rendering the conduct legal under ADEA. Id.
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E. FederalAccounting Rules
Governing Retiree Health Benefits
1. Private Sector: FAS 106
In the 1990s, the federal Financial Accounting Standards
Board ("FASB") implemented new accounting rules, specifically
Statement 106 ("FAS 106"), which changed dramatically how
private employers were required to report the cost of retiree health
benefits. 117 Instead of reporting this expense on the basis of costs
of benefits in the period in which they are paid, FAS 106 required
employers to report the cost of retiree health benefits as they are
earned, which entails estimating and accruing both the future
costs and current spending for these obligations.118 FAS 106,
together with sharply rising medical costs, made employers aware
of the extent of their retiree health benefits liabilities. 11 9 Private
employers worried that implementing FAS 106 would lead to huge
drops in "reported corporate income and net worth, with negative
implications for shareholder values." 120 Because of FAS 106,
increasing numbers of employers began reducing or even
eliminating health insurance coverage. 121 In 1993, forty percent of
private employers offered retiree health benefits; by 2001, only
twenty-three percent did.122 While some studies question the
extent to which FAS 106 prompted employers to cut retiree health
benefits, 123 this brief summary of the substance and impact of FAS
106 on private retiree health benefits is instructive in forecasting
the effect of equally far-reaching public sector accounting rules to
be fully implemented by the end of 2008.
2. Public Sector: GAS 45
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board ("GASB") is a
nonprofit agency that sets accounting standards for state and local
governments.1 24 In 2004, the GASB issued Statement 45 ("GAS
45"), adopting rules that will do in the public sector what FAS 106
did in the private sector.1 25 GAS 45 is to be implemented
117. Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Summary of Statement No. 106,
Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions,
(1990).
118. Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at i.
119. Helen M. Kemp, The Employer Giveth And Taketh Away: Retiree Health
Benefits under ERISA-Governed Health Plans, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION:
THE BRIEF, Spring 2005, at 1.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
http:/
125.

Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at 20.
Kemp, supra note 119, at 1.
Id.
Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at 20.
Gov't Accounting Standards Bd., Facts About
/www.gasb.org/facts/facts-about-gasb.pdf.
GAS 45, supra note 1.

GASB,
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gradually, ultimately insisting that all state and local
governments compile data about their retiree health benefits and
report unfunded liabilities that will accrue for retirees in future
years. 126 Just as FAS 106 imposed accounting standards for
retiree health benefits that were already in place for private
pension obligations, GAS 45 will require public employers to
report unfunded retiree health benefit liabilities already required
for public pension obligations. 127 In sum, GAS 45 imposes no legal
obligations on the states with respect to the level or types of health
care benefits accorded to retirees or the financing of those
28
benefits.1
If the impact of FAS 106 in the private sector is any guide,
public employers will have a strong incentive in the wake of GAS
45, though not a legal duty, to set aside funds (known as prefunding) for PRHBs as they are incurred. 129 Of the forty-one
states reporting some contribution to retiree health coverage,
thirty states finance PRHBs on a pay-as-you-go basis while only
eleven states report some level of pre-funding. 130 Pre-funding, as a
tool for financing PRHBs, has its virtues and its drawbacks. On
the plus side, states that forgo pre-funding risk Wall Street
lowering their credit rating, which makes it far more expensive to
borrow money. 131 Pre-funding typically produces higher shortterm costs as compared to pay-as-you-go financing but may lower
costs in the long run, especially if the state's credit rating is
strengthened.1 32
Local governments in Michigan, previously
deterred from pre-funding PRHBs by state law, 133 were freed to
126. See id. (discussing the three year staggered phase-in of GAS 45). GAS
45 compliance is staggered, with smaller governments afforded more time to
comply. Id.
127. GAS 45, supra note 1.
128. MOODY'S SPECIAL REPORT, supranote 8, at 5.

129. Id. The unfunded liability is the amount of extra money that needs to
be set aside today and invested to cover the future costs of all promised
benefits earned to date by current employees and retirees. Legislative
Analyst's Office, Retiree Health Care Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.lao.ca.gov/RetireeHealth/RetFAQ.aspx (last visited October 4,
2008).
130. Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at 11. By the end of 2006, only
Arizona, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, and Wisconsin were on course to be
able to fully fund their PRHBs for the next thirty years. Prah, supra note 26.
Unfunded retiree health liabilities typically are far greater than governments'
unfunded pension liabilities. Legislative Analyst's Office, supra note 129. On
the whole, public employers have pre-funded eighty-five percent of pension
liabilities but only three percent of PRHBs. Larry Lipman, State's Pension
System Healthy, Report Finds, PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 19, 2007, § A, at 8A.
131. Prah, supra note 26.
Six states, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland,
Missouri, Utah, and Virginia have achieved the top rating for their bonds from
all three major rating agencies. MD. ATT'Y GEN., supra note 113, at 210, n.18.
132. Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at 23.
133. MICHIGAN COMMISSION ON PUBLIC PENSION AND RETIREE HEALTH
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pre-fund when the law was repealed in 1999.134 Pre-funding will
also help limit exposure of taxpayers to defaults. 135
On the minus side, some public employers fear that prefunding will change the nature and status of retiree health
benefits from unvested to vested. 136 Another disincentive to prefunding is the body of tax laws that strongly discourage
channeling such funded assets to other employer purposes if the
137
health plans are later discontinued.
III.

VESTING OF PRHBs

A. Framingthe Issue
It is instructive to approach the issue of the vesting of retiree
benefits by looking at typical phrases found in a CBA: the
agreement promises retirees "lifetime health benefits,"'138 but
another contract provision reserves the right of the public
employer to "modify or terminate all retiree benefits." 139 The
following seven topics warrant discussion.
First, assuming the CBA expires in three years, under what
circumstances does the promise of "lifetime health benefits"
survive expiration of the CBA? 140 Second, is the CBA rendered
ambiguous thanks to inclusion of the two seemingly conflicting
terms in the preceding paragraph? Third, if the CBA is deemed
ambiguous, what types of extrinsic evidence is admissible to
determine the survivability issue? Fourth, even if the promise of
"lifetime health benefits" survives the CBA's termination, is the
public employer free to modify the level of these benefits or is it
bound by benefits contained in the CBA? Fifth, even if the
promise of "lifetime health benefits" survives, which class of active
employees is entitled to them? 141 Sixth, even if more than one
13 (2000-2001). The law prevented local Michigan governments
from earmarking long-term investments for retires health care costs. Id.
134. Id. The repeal made a range of pre-funding options available to
Michigan local governments. Id.
135. Id. Another possible effect of pre-funding is "greater intergenerational
equity for taxpayers." Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at 24.
136. Kemp, supra note 119, at 2.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 3. Or the contract may promise PRHBs "indefinitely" or
"continuously." Id.
139. Id.
140. Can the promise survive for retirees but expire for active employees?
E.g., Poole v. City of Waterbury, 831 A.2d 211, 227-30 (Conn. 2003) (holding
that while the promise of continued PRHBs survives for retirees, "[i]t is
undisputed that active employees' benefits continue only until the expiration
of the agreement").
141. Are only those employees who retire during the term of the CBA
entitled to the benefits? What about employees who are eligible for retirement
during the CBA's term but retire after its expiration?
BENEFITS
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class of employee is entitled to "lifetime health benefits," will only
those employees who retire during the CBA's term be entitled to
exactly those benefits contained in the CBA?142 Lastly, when do
of employment, 143 upon
PRHBs vest, upon acceptance
1 44
or when the employee becomes eligible for
retirement,
retirement?
To be sure, many, if not all of these issues can be resolved by
contract language that clearly, explicitly, and unambiguously
spells out what is meant by "lifetime health benefit" and whether
1 45
language in the reservation clause applies to these benefits.
Unfortunately, few contracts are sufficiently unambiguous to aid a
1 46
reviewing court.
Even in the absence of the promise of "lifetime health
benefits," or a reservation clause in a CBA, courts differ over how
to answer questions one through seven above. If a CBA simply
promises retiree health benefits, can an inference of survivability
7
be deduced from silence about the duration of this promise?14
In one way or another, all of these questions entail some
aspect of what is known as vesting. Unfortunately, the word itself

142. Will those who retire after a CBA expires be subject to modifications
put in place in succeeding CBA's?
143. E.g., Thorning v. Hollister Sch. Dist., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 91, 94-95 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992) (holding elected officers of local school board became
contractually vested upon acceptance of employment); Duncan v. Retired Pub.
Employees of Alaska, Inc., 71 P.3d 882, 886 (Alaska 2003) (finding that the
right to PHRBs vested "on employment and enrollment in the system," as
opposed to when the employee is eligible to receive those benefits.
144. See, e.g., Chisholm, 696 N.W. 2d at 338 (holding that former employee's
right to PRHBs vested at the time she retired).
145. But in the public sector, promises in the CBA of lifetime retiree benefits
may be overruled by state constitutional or statutory provisions. See, e.g.,
Mass. Water Res. Auth. v. AFSCME, 856 N.E.2d 884, 889-90 (Mass. App. Ct.
2006) (holding a CBA to be superseded by statute); 90 MD. OP. ATT'Y. GEN.,
supra note 114, at 220-22 (reporting the Md. AG's opinion that a CBA cannot
alter PRHBs unless the state legislature ratifies it).
146. Contra Maryland's Benefits Handbook outlining retiree benefits states
'Membership in the State Health Program does not constitute a contract. The
provisions of the program are subject to annual review and modification.
Costs may vary each year."' 90 MD. OP. Arr'Y. GEN. at 219 (quoting STATE
RETIREMENT AGENCY, BENEFITS HANDBOOK FOR THE EMPLOYEES AND
TEACHERS PENSION SYSTEMS 46 (Rev. July 2004) (providing an example of an

unambiguous contract denying PHRB rights).
147. See Senn v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 951 F.2d 806, 816 (7th Cir.
1992) (noting that "mere silence" as to vesting of welfare benefits did not
render the CBA ambiguous, but rather reflected that the parties did not
intend the PHRB's to survive the agreement). Because silence as to duration
does not create an ambiguity, resort to extrinsic evidence is improper. Id.; see
generally Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and
Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992) (surveying default contract
rules that fill "gaps" in contracts, with or without the parties' consent).
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may refer both to the duration of a promise 148 and whether what is
promised may be unilaterally altered or terminated during the
retiree's lifetime. 149 What is more, there are other phrases that
may or may not be synonyms for the word vesting: "accrued
151
"lifetime benefits,"1 52
benefits," 150 "contractual obligations,"
1 54
"inviolable contract,"' 53 "property rights" in retiree benefits,
"deferred compensation,"' 155 and a "contractual, quasi-pension
benefit."156 Some or all of these terms may mean that benefits last
for the life of the retiree and that those benefits may not be
diminished or terminated. 5 7 Or, these terms may only mean the
former, leaving the public employer free to modify the level of
these benefits. 5 8 And even if vested retiree benefits can be
reasonably modified but not eliminated, what are the limits of
148. See Poole, 831 A. 2d at 230 (deciding that plaintiffs have a vested right
to medical benefits that survived the expiration of their CBA).
149. See id. at 231 (stating the rule that a vested right may not be modified
unilaterally).
150. See, e.g., Duncan, 71 P.3d at 887 (explaining that "accrued benefits"
encompasses PRHBs, and that they may not be diminished or impaired under
Alaska Constitution).
151. See Shelby Twp. Police & Fire Ret. Bd. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 475
N.W.2d 249, 255 (Mich. 1991) (interpreting a state constitutional provision to
mean that public pensions created "contractual obligations" that could not be
revoked).
152. See Cole v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 2d 850, 879 (E.D. Mich.
2005) (ordering an employer to resume health benefits where employees had
contracted for the benefit to continue for the "rest of their lives").
153. See Jones v. Bd. of Trs. of Ky. Ret. Sys., 910 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Ky. 1995)
(deciding that Kentucky retirement system formed an "inviolable contract"
between [system] employees and the state, such that the legislature cannot
decrease benefits).
154. See Weiner v. County of Essex, 620 A.2d 1071, 1079-80 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1992) (finding public employees had a "property interest" in their
benefits). One consequence of labeling PRHBs a "property" right is to trigger
the requirement of procedural due process safeguards, such as notice and
opportunity to be heard, before retirees' benefits can be impaired. Id.; see also
McMinn v. Okla. City, 952 P.2d 517, 523 (Okla. 1997) (upholding retiree's due
process right to cross-examine city witness as to how additional retirement
benefits were calculated).
155. See Roth v. City of Glendale, 614 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Wis. 2000)
(reasoning that employees expect assurances, when trading wages for
"deferred compensation" such as retirement benefits, that the benefits will
continue).
156. See Colo. Springs Fire Fighters Ass'n, 784 P.2d at 768 (rejecting
plaintiffs' claim that their PRHBs had vested because they were provided by a
"contractual quasi-pension type benefit").
157. See MD. ATTY GEN., supra note 113, at 208 (reporting that "[n]ot all
impairments of contractual obligations are unconstitutional; an impairment is
constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose." (citing U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25)). The Md. AG concluded that
there was no contractual right to PRHBS that would be impaired if the
legislature amended the statute to alter benefits. Id. at 210.
158. Id.
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reasonableness? In a nutshell, there is no consensus among the
states whether PRHBs are a vested or contractual right.
Another complicating factor found in the public sector that is
largely absent under ERISA-governed welfare benefits is that
states may authorize, 15 9 prohibit, or even require CBA's to vest
PRHBs. 160 ERISA merely leaves the issue of PRHB vesting to the
contracting parties, unlike pensions where ERISA clearly dictates
vesting rules.161 But in the public sector, what if a statute forbids
the vesting of PRHBs but the contract includes a promise of
lifetime retiree benefits? What about the reverse situation? Can a
2
city council resolution vest PRHBs, even absent a CBA?16
In sorting out these vesting issues, the courts rely on an array
of analytical tools and doctrines: contract law, 163 the creating of
presumptions in favor or against vesting, 16 4 promises contained in
employee handbooks,1 65 promissory or equitable estoppel, 166 the
role of interest arbitration, 167 pre-funding,16 s and, arguably, the
law governing fiduciaries. 169 Some courts look to ERISA and the
159. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Pennsylvania, 617 A.2d 55, 58-59 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1992) (interpreting the statutory language to mean that retirees could
enroll in state's health plan if they elected to do so, but did not give them
contractual rights to a specific plan); MD. ATT'Y GEN., supra note 113, at 221
(reporting the Maryland Attorney General's opinion that PRHBs can be a
subject of collective bargaining under Maryland's state collective bargaining
law); Chisholm, 696 N.W.2d at 334-35 (stating that statute authorized public
employer to pay PRHBs indefinitely beyond the term of the CBA).
160. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 465-66 (repeating the
longstanding presumption that, absent clear intent to the contrary, laws do
not create "private contractual or vested rights"); FraternalOrder of Police
Lodge No. 2, 8 S.W.3d at 264 (denying vested rights to public pensioners
because there was no contractual obligation, only "a gratuitous allowance,
terminable at the will of the grantor"); see supra note 146 (providing an
example of an unambiguous teacher contract denying PHRB vesting or
contractual rights).
161. See supra Part II.C (providing a brief overview of ERISA).
162. E.g., Emerling v. Vill. of Hamburg, 680 N.Y.S.2d 37, 37-38 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998) (holding that village resolution promising lifetime benefits vested in
employees who worked the requisite number of years, absent a CBA).
163. See infra Part III.B (examining whether PRHBs vest under contract
law).
164. See infra Part III.D (exploring presumption in favor of and against
PRHB vesting in ambiguous CBA's).
165. See Bernstein, 617 A.2d at 61 (rejecting the employees' argument that
promises in the employee handbook created vested contractual rights to health
benefits).
166. See infra Part I.F (analyzing the use of equitable or promissory
estoppel to vest retiree benefits).
167. See infra Part III.G (reviewing the vesting of PRHBs through interest
arbitration).
168. See infra Part III.H (reporting on the vesting of PHRBs through prefunding).
169. See infra Part III. (theorizing about the availability of breach of
fiduciary duty claims in disputes over the vesting of PHRBs).
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170
NLRA for guidance-sometimes wisely-sometimes unwisely.
Since vesting of PRHBs may derive from a state constitution or
statute or from interest arbitration, all these sources must be
In addition, a public
assessed alongside contract doctrines.
employer's long-standing practice of providing retirees with
171
specific benefits must be factored in.
Part III aims to answer only the durational aspect of vesting;
when do PRHBs last for the life of retirees? Part IV then
addresses an equally vexing aspect of vesting; when may even
vested retiree benefits be modified or terminated?

B. Vesting under Contract Law
The weight of authority makes clear that contractual
obligations usually do not survive expiration of the CBA.172 The
best public sector case applying contract principles in addressing
73
the vesting of retiree benefits is Poole v. City of Waterbury :
A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties,
which is determined from the language used interpreted in the light
of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with
the transaction .... The intent of the parties is to be ascertained by

a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and ...the
language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary
meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject
matter of the contract .... Where the language of the contract is

clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according
to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity
where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity....
Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the
rather than from one party's
language used in the contract 174
subjective perception of the terms.
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
concluded that the language in the contract providing that the city
"shall continue in full force and effect the [medical] benefits for
each ...

employee who retires ...

after [the execution of this

175
agreement]" created an ambiguity over the duration of PRHBs.

170. E.g., Davis, 70 S.W.3d at 727 (drawing upon ERISA to hold that the
PRHBs did not vest); Colo. Springs Fire Fighters Ass'n, 784 P.2d at 772
(drawing upon ERISA to conclude that PRHBS did not vest).
171. E.g., Poole, 831 A.2d at 230 (finding that the prior practice of continuing
benefits for retirees beyond expiration of their CBA constituted the intent to
create a vested right to PRHBs on retirement).
172. See Litton Financial Printing Div., a Div. of Litton Business Systems,
Inc. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 207 (1991) (noting that "in the ordinary course,"
contractual obligations end when the CBA expires).
173. 831A.2d at 211.
174. Id. at 224 (quoting Niehaus v. Cowles Bus. Media, Inc., 819 A.2d 765,
771 (Conn. 2003)).
175. Id. at 227.
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Ambiguity in a contract permits the court to consider
extrinsic evidence to clear up the ambiguity. 176 In Poole, extrinsic
evidence revealed that the city had been continuing to provide
PRHBs to retirees beyond the expiration of their CBA. 177 While
conceding that this practice "could have as easily been a result of
intent as inertia," the court affirmed the trial court's conclusion
that the retirees had a vested right to PRHBs that survived
7
expiration of the CBA.1 8
When a contract lacks the magic phrases "lifetime benefits,"
"vested rights," or "contractual obligation," some courts have
analogized to ERISA to conclude that retirees do not have a vested
right to PRHBs. 179 The Tennessee Supreme Court insisted there
must be "clear and express language" indicating an intent to
80
confer a vested benefit.
C. Vesting under State Constitutions,
Statutes, and City Ordinances
Unlike the private sector where ERISA governs welfare
benefits nationwide, in the public sector each state decides for
itself whether PRHBs vest under a state constitution, a state
statute, or a city ordinance, even absent a contract.' 8 ' Kentucky is
an example of a state where PRHBs vest under a provision of the
state's constitution. 8 2 States like Alaska and Michigan have state
constitutional provisions that protect accrued benefits of
retirees. 8 3 But while the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that
PRHBs fell within this protected category, 84 the Michigan
85
Supreme Court held that the same phrase excluded PRHBs.

176. Id. at 229.
177. Id. at 229-30.
178. Id.
179. See Colo. Springs Fire Fighters Ass'n, 784 P.2d at 772 (drawing upon
ERISA to conclude that PRHBS did not vest); Davis, 70 S.W.3d at 727
(drawing upon ERISA to hold that the PRHBs did not vest).
180. Id. at 727-28
181. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text (providing a brief
overview of ERISA's national standards).
182. Jones, 910 S.W. 2d at 712 (citing KRS 61.692, the Kentucky statute
creating KERS, the Kentucky Employees Retirement System).
183. See ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 7 (defining membership in public
retirement systems as a contractual right, prohibiting impairment of accrued
benefits); MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (imposing a contractual obligation on the
state not to impair "the accrued financial benefits" of state retirement plans).
184. Duncan, 71 P.3d at 888.
185. Studier v. Mich. Pub. Sch. Employees' Ret. Bd., 698 N.W.2d 350, 358

(Mich. 2005).
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Similarly, states differ over whether the term "retirement benefit"
6
merely refers to pension benefits or also encompasses PHRBs.18
In Maryland, a CBA can vest PRHBs, but only if adopted by
the legislature.18 7 An opinion by Maryland's attorney general
states the general rule that a "strong presumption" exists against
statutes creating contractual rights.18 8 A statute itself is treated
like a contract, however, "when the language and circumstances
evince a legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual
nature enforceable against the state."18 9 The Maryland attorney
general concluded that the state statute that extended health
benefits to certain classes of retirees did not "expressly create a
contractual right."190
In Colorado Springs Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Colorado
Springs,191 the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that a municipal
ordinance did not vest PRHBs because it did not address the level
of benefits. 192 A Pennsylvania court relied on statutory language
affording retirees an option to elect PRHBs to conclude that such
93
benefits had not vested.
In Massachusetts Water Resources Authority v. American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council
93,194 a Massachusetts appellate court held that a CBA that tried

to regulate a public employer's contribution toward retiree health
insurance premiums was superseded by a state statute that
5
established the public employer's contribution rate.19
In New York, when the source of vested PRHBs stem from
statute rather than from a contract, retirees need not file 196a notice
of claim before challenging any reduction in such benefits.

186. See, e.g., McMinn, 952 P.2d at 521, (defining "retirement benefits" to
encompass much more than just pensions, including "insurance coverage and
profit sharing').
187. MD. AT''Y GEN., supra note 113, at 220.
188. Id. at 207 (quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 465-66).
189. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 18 n.14.
190. MD. ATTY GEN., supra note 113, at 209.
191. 784 P.2d. 766.
192. Id. at 773. This logic illustrates how the question of vesting and
whether vested benefits may be modified overlap or may be interdependent.
For example, under the Colorado Supreme Court's logic, if a CBA says retirees
are entitled to $500 per year for health benefits, benefits vest and cannot be
modified. If the CBA says the employer will contribute an unspecified amount
for PRHBs, then there is no vesting and benefits can be modified or
withdrawn.
193. Bernstein, 617 A.2d at 59.
194. 856 N.E.2d 884 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
195. Id. at 889-90
196. Jones v. Bd. of Educ. of the Watertown City Sch. Dist., 816 N.Y.S.2d
796, 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
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D. Presumptions in Favor or Against
Vesting in Ambiguous Contracts
1. Vesting Presumptions in the PrivateSector Governed by
ERISA
a. Presumption in Favor of Vesting
The leading private sector case finding a rebuttable
presumption in favor of retiree health benefits vesting when the
CBA is silent or ambiguous is the 1983 Sixth Circuit ruling in
UAW v. Yard-Man.197 Finding the CBA ambiguous over whether
retiree health benefits survive expiration of the CBA,198 the court
created an inference that the parties intended such benefits to vest
based in part on the theory that conditions in the workplace create
employee expectations of lifetime benefits.1 99 With retiree health
benefits "typically understood as a form of delayed compensation
or reward for past services," the court found that retirees agreed to
200
lower wages in exchange for lifetime retiree health benefits.
Without a presumption in favor of vesting, a union, owing no duty
to retirees, could negotiate these benefits away after the
employees retired. 20 1 The Yard-Man presumption in favor of
vested retiree health benefits in the face of ambiguous contract
language has been embraced by the Fourth 202 and Eleventh
203
Circuits.

197. 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983).
198. Id. at 1480.
199. Id. at 1482. See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The
Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Contract in the Federal Common Law of
Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153, 172-78 (1995) (discussing federal
cases employing presumptions for and against vesting; agreeing with UAWs
presumption in favor of vesting); Donald T. Weckstein, The Problematic
Provision and Protection of Health and Welfare Benefits for Retirees, 24 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 101, 128-32 (1987) (reviewing the arguments for and against
presumptions; arguing for a presumption against vesting, with extrinsic
evidence allowable to rebut); Douglas Sondgeroth, Note, High Hopes: Why
Courts Should Fulfill Expectations of Lifetime Retiree Health Benefits in
Ambiguous Collective BargainingAgreements, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1215, 1261-62

(2001) (advocating a rebuttable presumption in favor of vesting in light of
reasonable expectation that PRHBs would continue).
200. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1482.

201. Id.
202. See Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989) (calling it
an "understanding of the context in which retiree benefits arise," rather than a
presumption or an inference; finding this "understanding" to support PRHB
vesting).
203. See United Steelworkers v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1505
(11th cir. 1988) (citing Yard-Man with approval while holding the PRHBs to
have survived the CBA; does not expressly endorse the Yard-Man
presumption).
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b. Presumption Against Vesting
20 6
20 5
20 4
Seventh, 20 7
Six other circuits, the First, Third, Second,
2
0
9
Circuit Courts of Appeal reject the YardEighth 208 and Ninth
Man inference, refusing to weigh employee expectations in
resolving ambiguous contract language over whether retiree
health benefits have vested. In support of this position, the Eighth
Circuit pointed to the fact that ERISA exempts welfare benefits
from its vesting rules. 210 Anderson v. Alpha Portland Industries
held that because Congress had remained neutral on the issue of
presumptions, it is consistent with federal labor policy to insist
that plaintiffs prove their cases "without the aid of gratuitous
inferences. ''211 The Seventh Circuit rejected a presumption either
for or against vesting, turning to extrinsic evidence when the CBA
is ambiguous, but stressing the "limitation of liabilities that is
implicit in the negotiation of a written contract having a definite
expiration date." 212 In rejecting the use of a Yard-Man inference,
the Third Circuit relied, in part, on the fact that retirees who
worry that the union will not represent them adequately should
have made certain while they were active employees that the CBA
guaranteed lifetime benefits. 2 13 The Fifth Circuit remains neutral
on the question whether there should be a presumption in favor of
21 4
vesting, preferring to decide the issue on a case-by-case basis.

204. See Allen v. Adage, Inc., 967 F.2d 695, 698 (1st Cir. 1992) (rejecting the
use of vesting presumptions implicitly by ignoring the topic).
205. See UAW v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 139-140 (3d Cir. 1999)
(disapproving of the Yard-Man presumption explicitly).
206. See Joyce v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 171 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1999)
(refusing to infer vesting without language in the CBA that "itself reasonably
supports that interpretation").
207. See Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1993)
(agreeing that extrinsic evidence is proper in resolving ambiguous CBA's while
expressly rejecting the use of presumptions both for and against vesting).
208. See Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 836 F.2d 1512, 1517 (8th Cir.
1988) (disagreeing with the Yard-Man presumption in favor of vesting because
it would be illogical in light of Congress' exempting PRHBs from ERISA
vesting requirements).
209. See Bazzone v. Auto. Indus. Welfare Fund, No. 87-2175, 1988 WL
58340, at *4 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1988) (unpublished table decision)
(acknowledging Yard-Man, but refusing to endorse the use of vesting
presumptions).
210. Alpha Portland Indus., 836 F.2d. at 1516.
211. Id. at 1517.
212. Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 608.
213. See Skinner Engine, 188 F.3d at 141 (admonishing those fearing union
abandonment to make sure that "specific vesting language" is inserted into the
CBA).
214. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Champion Int'l Corp., 908 F.2d
1252, 1261 (5th Cir. 1990).
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2. Vesting Presumptions in the Public Sector
a. Presumption in Favor of Vesting
The key public sector case embracing a presumption in favor
of vesting of PRHBs is Roth v. City of Glendale.215 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court made clear that a presumption in favor of vesting
is in accord with a broader understanding "of the context in which
retiree benefits arise" because it satisfies employees' "legitimate
216
expectations" that their bargained for benefits would continue.
Roth characterized these bargained for benefits as "deferred
compensation" for past services rendered, and not gratuities from
the employer. 217 When employees give up current wages for later
retirement benefits, they do not anticipate that the benefits they
earned will be "whittled away," or exposed to the "contingencies of
future negotiations." 218 A no-vest presumption creates the risk
that deferred compensation for past services will come to be seen
219
as a mere gratuity.
The Roth court stressed that an employer cannot promise
retiree health benefits as an "inducement to employment" and
then eliminate this benefit after an employee has retired, having
fulfilled all conditions for receiving these benefits. 220 Moreover,
since the union does not represent retirees (and could have a
conflict of interest if it did), Roth viewed a vesting presumption as
a means to protect the "voiceless" worker in case the union chose
to sacrifice retirees' benefits in favor of active employees'
221
benefits.
Another argument in favor of a presumption that PRHBs vest
is that resort to presumptions only arises in cases where the
contract language is ambiguous. 222 Under canons of contract
interpretation, if terms in a contract are ambiguous, it must be
223
construed against the drafter.

215. 614 N.W.2d at 472.
216. Id. at 472.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 473.
222. But see United Steelworkers, 855 F.2d at 1504 (endorsing the Yard-Man
presumption in favor of vesting despite finding the CBA unambiguous); YardMan, 716 F.2d at 1480 (moving on to the presumption issue only after finding

the CBA ambiguous).
223. See Graham v. Goodman, 850 S.W.2d 351, 355 (Mo. 1993) (stating the
canon as a 'last-resort" when the contract is open to two interpretations);
McMinn, 952 P.2d at 521-22 (interpreting retirement benefits to include
PRHBs, noting that ambiguities go against the city that drafted the CBA).
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b. Presumption Against Vesting
Both Tennessee and Rhode Island have staked a position
contrary to Wisconsin's presumption in favor of vesting. In Davis
v. Wilson County,224 the Tennessee Supreme Court favored a
presumption against vesting, in part, by relying on the distinction
in the private sector under ERISA between pension benefits which
vest automatically and welfare benefits that do not. 225 The court
left no doubt that the retiree bears the burden of establishing that
226
the employer expressly intended the benefits to vest.
In Anderson v. Town of Smithfield,227 a Rhode Island court
supported its presumption against vesting by arguing that it is
sound public policy not to impose lifetime obligations on employers
228
without clear language expressing their intent to vest benefits.
The continued availability of health insurance, moreover, depends
on the insurer, a third party not bound by the CBA. 229 The insurer
could terminate coverage of public employees or terminate the
particular plan. 230 The insurer could increase costs to the point
that the city became unable to afford insurance at all. 231 At that
point the defense of impossibility of performing the contract would
be available, absolving the city of any obligation, and leaving the
retirees with no health insurance. 232 Finally, the Anderson court
cited other "uncertain variables," such as inflation, changing
medical technology, and rising cost of treatment in support of its
233
presumption against vesting.
c. Deciding Vesting Question without Either Presumption
The leading public sector case rejecting a presumption either
for or against vesting when the CBA is silent or ambiguous is
Poole v. City of Waterbury.234 In Poole, a city provided medical
235
benefits to retired city firefighters even absent a CBA.
Eventually, however, CBA's negotiated between the city and union
included promises of PRHBs. 236 While the city and union were
negotiating a new CBA, the state legislature intervened and
accused the city of gross fiscal mismanagement for, among other
224. 70 S.W.3d at 727.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. No. PC/05-3823, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 181, at *19 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Dec. 20, 2005).
228. Id.
229. Id. at *20 (quoting Poole, 831 A.2d. at 233).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at*21.
234. 831 A.2d at 224.
235. Id. at 216.
236. Id.
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things, paying health care benefits out of the city general fund. 237
The city's bond rating had been downgraded as a result. 238 The
state legislature responded by establishing an oversight board
239
authorized to disregard CBA's and to arbitrate labor disputes.
An oversight board arbitration award aimed at altering retirees'
medical benefits was challenged as: 1) a breach of contract; 2) an
ultra vires act; 3) a taking under the state and federal
constitutions; and 4) an impairment of contract rights in violation
of the federal constitution. 240 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut ruled that the trial court properly determined that
PRHBs survived expiration of the CBA's.241 In reaching this
conclusion, Poole reviewed the arguments in favor of and against
vesting of retiree benefits when the CBA is ambiguous and found
the rationales for either presumption unpersuasive. 242 It found
the presumption in favor of vesting (or "burden shifting") to
conflict with the principle that contractual obligations ordinarily
cease at the expiration of a CBA.243 Poole also concluded that both
presumptions fail to adequately account for the conflicting and
important policy considerations involved. 244 Taking the employer's
point of view, Poole cautioned courts to not lightly find indefinite
benefit obligations, especially when, unlike with pension plans, the
employer cannot predict or control health care costs. 245 At the
same time, from the employee's perspective, the promise of retiree
health benefits is a significant inducement in determining
employment. 246 Essentially, the employer and employee interests
cancel each other out, leaving the court to conclude that the best
course is to apply general principles of contract interpretation on a
case-by-case basis.2 47
Here, the court found the contract
ambiguous, looked to extrinsic evidence and the conduct of the
parties and concluded that the PRHBs vested and survived
248
expiration of the CBA's without resort to either presumption.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
(U.S.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 217.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 223 (citing Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 207
1991)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id. at 230.
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E. Use of ExtrinsicEvidence to Resolve
Ambiguities Over whether Retiree Benefits Vest
Extrinsic evidence is admissible when contract language is
ambiguous. 249 A contract is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more
than one interpretation based on its language alone. 25 0 In the face
of contract language promising retirees "lifetime" health benefits
and a clause reserving to the employer the right to alter or
terminate retiree benefits, most courts would consider the CBA
ambiguous. 25 1 The court would then entertain extrinsic evidence
to aid in assessing whether the PRHB vests and whether the
obligation survives CBA's expiration. 252 By contrast, if contract
language is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to
253
create an ambiguity.
Once allowed, courts differ over what forms of extrinsic
evidence may be used to resolve vesting ambiguities. Take the
example of representations in employee handbooks that PRHBs
are for the lifetime of the retiree. In one Pennsylvania case,
employees argued that the offer in a handbook of fully paid state
254
coverage of health benefits induced them to continue working.
Relying on precedent, the court stated that employee handbooks
are not "legislative action," and do not confer contractual property
rights unless the legislature expressly provides a contractual
obligation. 25 5 The weight of authority holds that an employer's
unilateral act of publishing its policies in a handbook does not
25 6
constitute a "meeting of the minds" necessary for a contract.
Since representations in handbooks are not bargained for by the

249. See, e.g., id. at 225 (discussing the basics of contract law, including the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence to interpret ambiguities).
250. Id.; Chisholm, 696 N.W.2d at 337.
251. Compare Jensen v. Sipco, Inc, 38 F.3d 945, 952 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding
a CBA with both a lifetime benefit promise and a clause reserving the
employer's right to modify to be ambiguous), with In re Unisys Corp. Retiree
Med. Benefit ERISA Litig., 58 F.3d 896, 903-04 (3d Cir. 1995) (deciding that a
CBA was not ambiguous where it contained a promise of lifetime PRHBs while
reserving the right to terminate those benefits).
252. See Poole, 831 A.2d at 225; Chisholm, 696 N.W.2d at 337; Bidlack, 993
F.2d at 608; (employing extrinsic evidence in each case to determine whether
the PRHBs vest where the CBA is ambiguous).
253. See Am. Fed'n. of Grain Millers v. Int'l Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976,
981 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding extrinsic evidence inadmissible to change meaning
of unambiguous contract language).
254. Bernstein, 617 A.2d at 59.
255. Id. at 60 (quoting Pivarnik v. Pa. Dep't of Transp., 474 A.2d 732, 734
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984)).
256. See, e.g., Richardson v. Charles Cole Mem'l Hosp., 466 A.2d 1084, 1085
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (discussing employee handbooks and the weight carried
by the representations made within them); see generally Richard Harrison
Winters, Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-at-Will Contracts, 1985
DUKE L.J. 196 (1985) (surveying the field of employee handbooks).
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parties, promises are merely gratuities. 25 7 New Jersey draws a
legal distinction between a duly enacted and published formal
258
and an informal
Attorney General's opinion which is admissible,
25 9
opinion which is inadmissible as hearsay.
Conduct of the parties is yet another example of extrinsic
evidence the court may admit as evidence that promises of lifetime
PRHBs survive expiration of the CBA. For example, evidence that
the public employer continued paying for PRHBs even after the
contract ended was admissible to show that the benefits outlive
260
the CBA.
The use of extrinsic evidence overlaps the doctrines of ultra
vires and estoppel. For example, whether representations by a
human resources manager that PRHBs are for retirees' lifetime
may be admissible as extrinsic evidence or as part of an estoppel
claim for benefits may turn on whether the manager's
representations were ultra vires in a primary sense262(i.e., void) 261 or
in a secondary sense (i.e., enforceable by estoppel).
F. Use of Equitable or Promissory
Estoppel to Vest Retiree Benefits
Promissory estoppel may be invoked to vest retiree health
benefits only for agreements "implied in law" where there is no
The New Jersey Supreme Court
actual contract in fact. 263
explained estoppel as the principal that "one may, by voluntary
conduct, be precluded from taking a course of action that would
work injustice and wrong to one who with good reason and in good
faith has relied upon such conduct." 264 In Wood v. Borough of
Wildwood Crest,265 a police officer with twenty-two and a half
years of actual service purchased two and a half years of service
credit to enable him to receive PRHBs. 266 He discussed the
legality of this move with the acting Chief of Police and with
257. Richardson, 466 A.2d at 1085.
258. See Weiner v. County of Essex, 620 A.2d 1071, 1077 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1992) (noting that formally published attorney general opinions are
admissible as a hearsay exception under the New Jersey rules of evidence).
259. See id. (concluding that a letter of the deputy attorney general stating
that the county was obligated to continue paying post-retirement medical
benefits was inadmissible hearsay).
260. See, e.g., Anderson, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 181, at *3-5 (determining
that in this case the public employer continued paying for PRHBs, even after
the contract had come to an end).
261. See Wood, 726 A.2d at 313-14 (describing ultra vires in the primary
sense).
262. See id. (describing ultra vires in the secondary sense).
263. Chisholm, 696 N.W.2d at 337.
264. Summer Cottagers' Ass'n of Cape May v. City of Cape May, 117 A.2d
585, 590 (N.J. 1955).
265. 726 A.2d at 311.
266. Id.
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several other city officials who all assured him that he would be
eligible for retiree health benefits. 267 For three years, the city paid
the retiree's medical benefits before discovering that an amended
statute required twenty-five years of actual service for a retiree to
be eligible for medical benefits. 268 When the city stopped paying
269
those benefits, the retiree sued to restore them.
The court made clear that while equitable estoppel is rarely
invoked against a public employer, its use is permissible "where
the interests of justice, morality and common fairness clearly
dictate that course." 270 So long as the city's act is not utterly
beyond the city's jurisdiction, equitable estoppel may be invoked to
prevent injustice.27 1 In Wood, the court concluded the city was
estopped from terminating the retiree's medical benefits since no
essential public function was compromised by vesting the
272
benefits.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that public
employees become entitled to their pension benefits at the time of
retirement and their employers are estopped from denying a
promise that has been made to provide those benefits.27 3 Besides
showing reasonable reliance, plaintiff must also show that
"enforcement of the promise is the only means of avoiding
274
injustice."
In Martin v. City of Ottumwa,275 another "years of service"
estoppel case, the retiree had worked for the city for twelve
years. 276 Although the city council had enacted a "years of service"
requirement, Martin was assured by the city's human resources
manager that the new rule did not apply to him. 277 Several
months after Martin retired the city discovered its mistake (he did
not meet their service requirements) and discontinued his retiree
health benefits. 278 The Iowa court refused to invoke equitable
estoppel because the city did not take "unfair advantage" of the
plaintiff.279
Even though the retiree relied on the human
267. Id. at 312.
268. Id. at 313.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 313-14 (citing Gruber v. Mayor & Tp. Comm., 186 A.2d 489, 495
(N.J. 1962)).
271. Id. at 314.
272. Id. at 316.
273. Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Employees Ret. Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740,
749 (Minn. 1983).
274. Law Enforcement Labor Servs. v. County of Mower, 469 N.W.2d 496,
501 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 483 N.W.2d 696 (Minn.
1992).
275. 713 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006) (unpublished).
276. Id. at *1.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at *3.
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resources manager's promise, the court was unable to find any
28 0
exceptional circumstances to justify invoking equitable estoppel.
At the federal level, a panel of the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals first ruled that the government owed free lifetime medical
care to some veterans because recruiters promised them such care
if they served in the military for at least twenty years. 28 1 Upon
rehearing en banc, however, the full Federal Circuit reversed the
panel and refused to find an implied contract because the
recruiters had lacked the authority to promise lifetime health
care.

2 82

G. Vesting Through Interest Arbitration
Many states' public employment labor relations acts deny
certain public employees, like police officers and firefighters who
perform essential duties, the right to strike.28 3 As a quid pro quo,
such essential employees may invoke a special procedure for
28 4
resolving labor disputes known as binding interest arbitration.
Interest arbitration is to be distinguished from grievance
arbitration in that the latter is invoked during the term of the
contract to resolve disputes arising under it,285 while the former
comes into play only after the employer and union reach an
impasse in negotiating a new CBA.286 Whether the employer must
submit to interest arbitration depends on whether the issue in
dispute is a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining. 28 7 In

280. Id.

281. Schism v. United States, 239 F.3d 1280, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2001), rev'd en
banc, 316 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Robert Pear, Court Says 2 Veterans Are
Owed Lifetime Care, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2001, at A12.
282. Schism, 316 F.3d at 1299.
283. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 179A.18, subd. 1 (2008) (prohibiting "essential
employees" from striking); MINN. STAT. § 179A.03, subd. 7 (2008) (defining
essential employees as including, among others, firefighters and peace
officers).
284. See MINN. STAT. § 179A.16, subd. 2-8 (2008) (providing procedure for
essential employees to petition for interest arbitration); see also Broderdorf,
supra note 81, at 324 (recognizing that the right to invoke interest arbitration
exists for public employees prohibited from striking).
285. Black's Law Dictionary defines "grievance arbitration" as: "[a]rbitration
that involves the violation or interpretation of an existing contract." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 112 (8th ed. 2004); see also Broderdorf, supra note 81, at 338
(stating that grievance arbitration looks to the existing agreement).
286. Black's Law Dictionary defines "interest arbitration" as "[a]rbitration
that involves settling the terms of a contract being negotiated between the
parties; esp., in labor law, arbitration of a dispute concerning what provisions
will be included in a new collective- bargaining agreement." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 113 (8th ed. 2004); see also Broderdorf, supra note 81, at 324
(reporting that interest arbitration is most often used in public labor disputes
when the parties cannot agree to the terms of a new CBA).
287. Iowa State Educ. Ass'n v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d
793, 797 (Iowa 1985).

2008] Public Retiree Health Benefits in Light of New Accounting Rules

1179

many states, the subject of PRHBs has moved in and out of these
two categories. 288 If mandatory, the employer must submit to
interest arbitration; 28 9 if permissive, the employer may refuse and
290
instead, unilaterally change the level of benefits.
In City of Pittsburgh v. FraternalOrder of Police,291 the issue
of PRHBs was submitted to interest arbitration. 292
The
arbitration award allowed the city to modify its contribution
toward premium costs for PRHBs. 293 On appeal, the retirees
argued that the award violated the Contract Clauses of the United
States and state constitutions. 294 Rejecting this argument, the
court ruled that the Contract Clauses only barred unilateral
changes in contractual benefits, not modifications reached by
interest arbitration. 295 The City of Pittsburgh ruling, however,
only allowed the city to modify its PRHBs through interest
arbitration for active employees. 296 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had earlier ruled that benefits statutorily set could be
297
altered by an interest arbitration award.
In Anderson v.Town of Smithfield,298 a PRHB vesting dispute
was submitted to interest arbitration in Rhode Island. 299 The
arbitration award allowed the city to increase retirees' prescription
co-payments. 300 The retirees sued, arguing the arbitration could
not apply to them since their interests were not represented
during the arbitration process. 301 The court ruled that the
retirees' only vested right is to receive health care insurance from
their former employer, and "not the substantive health care

288. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local No. 1, 404 U.S. at 185

(deciding that "a 'modification' is a prohibited unfair labor practice only when
it changes a term that is a mandatory rather than a permissive subject of
bargaining"); Oklahoma Oncology & Hematology P.C. v. US Oncology, Inc.,

160 P.3d 936, 948 (Okla. 2007) (reporting the rule that only mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining are enforceable with interest arbitration
clauses).
289. Iowa State Educ. Ass'n, 369 N.W.2d at 797.
290. See Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc. v. County of Mower, 469
N.W.2d 496, 501 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 483 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2002)

(highlighting the change in Minnesota from the appellate court's holding that
PRHBs were a mandatory subject of bargaining, to the Supreme Court's
reversal).

291. 911 A.2d 651 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).
292. Id. at 651-52.
293. Id. at 652.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 653.
296. Id.
297. Commonwealth v. State Conference of State Police Lodges, 575 A.2d 94,
96-97 (Penn. 1990).
298. 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 181.
299. Id. at *5.
300. Id.
301. Id. at *8.
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benefits." 302 Since no vested right was affected by the arbitration
award, the retirees' participation in the arbitration was not
303
necessary.
H. Vesting Through Pre-FundingRetiree Health Benefits
The law is unclear whether the vesting of PRHBs may occur
once a state decides on pre-funding as a means of financing
PRHBs. Pre-funding is increasingly likely in light of GAS 45,304 as
opposed to the currently common pay-as-you-go method of
financing PRHBs.305 At any rate, if pre-funding consists in part of
employee contributions, "there may be a stronger argument that
the state has undertaken to devote the funds in the trust to retiree
health care benefits." 30 6 In other words, the act of pre-funding
may create a contractual obligation on the part of the state, which
could subject any change in benefits to challenge as an unlawful
impairment under the federal and state contract clauses. The
Supreme Court of Colorado rejected former city employees' claims
that a city ordinance created a vested quasi-pension-type benefit
for PRHBs, in part because city employees were not required to
contribute a percentage of their salary to pre-fund PRHBs and
participation in the program was wholly optional. 307
Such
reasoning lends credence to employer wariness toward pre-funding
of PRHBs, fearful that such financing schemes strengthen retirees'
claims that such benefits are vested.
I. Breach of FiduciaryDuty
While research has turned up no public sector case where
public employees have invoked breach of fiduciary duty as a tool
for supporting a claim that PRHBs have vested, it seems clear that
such a cause of action should lie, especially since it is available
under ERISA.308 Moreover, in Varity Corporation v. Howe,30 9 the
Supreme Court ruled than an employer acts as a fiduciary when it
communicates about benefits to its employees 31° and thus owes a
311
fiduciary duty not to misrepresent plan benefits.
302. Id, at *23.
303. Id.
304. See GAS 45, supra note 1 (creating new accounting rules that will
require public employers to report unfunded PRHB liabilities).
305. See Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at 11 (reporting that as of
2004, thirty states funded PRHBs on a pay-as-you go basis).
306. MD. ATTY GEN., supra note 113, at 210.
307. Colo. Springs Fire FightersAss'n, 784 P.2d at 771-72.
308. See Kemp, supra note 119, at 5 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481
U.S. 58, 62-63 (1987)) (reporting that breach of fiduciary duty claims are
actionable under ERISA).
309. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
310. Id. at 503.
311. Id. at 506.
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IV. MODIFYING OR TERMINATING VESTED PRHBs

As the preceding Part makes clear, if retiree health benefits
have not vested, they may be modified or terminated at will.312
This Part, by contrast, presupposes that PRHBs have vested in the
sense that they survive expiration of the CBA. Now attention
shifts to the knotty question of whether and to what extent even
vested PRHBs may be modified or terminated by the public
employer. The modification cases fall not so neatly into the
following three categories: (a) with consent; (b) if reasonable; and
(c) if substantially equal.
A. Vested PRHBs Cannot be Modified or Terminated without
Consent of Retirees Absent UnanticipatedCircumstances
An example of this extreme view is found in a decision of the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Housing & Redevelopment Authority
Of Chisholm,313 where the court ruled that vested PRHBs survived
expiration of the CBA and consequently the public employer could
31 4
not unilaterally terminate those benefits.
B. Modification of Vested PRHBs is Subject to the
Reasonableness Test Under the Contract Clauses
of the United States and State Constitutions
On one level it would seem that all vested PRHBs are ipso
facto subject to the Contract Clauses of the United States and/or
state constitutions, but not all cases address this issue when it
comes to what types of modifications constitute impairments.
States differ over what kinds of modifications to PRHBs pass
constitutional muster. As a general rule, vested PRHBs may be
modified without violating the Contract Clause if reasonable and
necessary to serve an important public purpose. 315 For example,
the attorney general of Maryland found that protecting the
soundness of a retirement system amounted to an important and
legitimate public purpose. 316 The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled
that switching retirees from a PPO plan to HMOs did not violate
the impairment clause of the state constitution, 317 while conceding
that these retirees enjoyed vested benefits at whatever level they

312. E.g., Davis, 70 S.W.3d at 728 (holding PRHBs did not automatically
vest and could be altered or terminated by employer at any time); MD. A'Vr'Y
GEN., supra note 113, at 224 (stating that the statute did not create a
contractual obligation to provide PRHBs).
313. 696 N.W.2d at 337-38.
314. Id.
315. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25.
316.

MD. ATT'Y GEN., supra note 113, at 209-10.

317. Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke County v. McCrary, 635 S.E.2d 150, 153
(Ga. 2006)
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had when they retired. 318 The change in coverage did not violate
their vested rights because the retirees were only guaranteed costfree coverage, not a specific type of coverage. 319 Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled that a change in the valuation
method for PRHBs from book value to modified market value for
calculating retirement benefits did not constitute a substantial
320
impairment under the Contract Clause.
The Supreme Court of Alaska ruled that when assessing
whether modifications to PRHBs were reasonable under the
Contract Clause, a comparative analysis of disadvantages and
compensating advantages of changes to PRHBs must be
undertaken by focusing on the entire group of employees rather
than from an individual retiree's perspective. 321 In this regard,
equivalent value must be proven by comparison of benefits
322
provided, not merely by comparing old and new premium costs.
Many cases assessing what constitutes an unconstitutional
impairment of vested PRHBs under the Contract Clause have
looked to cases involving changes to vested pension benefits for
323
guidance.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut made clear that the
burden is on retirees to prove that modifications to PRHBs
diminished their benefits "below a level reasonably commensurate
with the coverage they enjoyed before." 324 This "reasonably
commensurate" test is borrowed from the law governing when
vested pension benefits can be modified. 325 For example, a
Maryland court concluded that a public employer may unilaterally
change pension benefits so long as any modifications "do not
adversely alter the benefits," or if the change in benefits is
326
adverse, they are "replaced with comparable benefits."

318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Bd. of Trustees of Ky. Ret. Sys.'s, 910 S.W.2d at 715 (Ky. 1995).
321. Duncan, 71 P.3d at 892.
322. Id.
323. E.g., Bd. of Trustees of Ky. Ret. Sys.'s, 910 S.W.2d at 715 (discussing
cases from jurisdictions assessing whether changes to pension plans violate
the Contract Clause).
324. Poole, 831 A.2d at 233-34.
325. Zielinski v. Pabst Brewing Co., 463 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 2006).

326. Davis v. Mayor & Alderman of City of Annapolis, 635 A.2d 36, 40 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
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C. Modifications to Vested PRHBs are Permissible
so Long as Retiree Benefits are Substantially
Equal to Benefits for Active or CurrentEmployees
Allowing changes to PRHBs so long as retiree and active
employee benefits remain substantially the same is an ingenious
way to sidestep the potential conflict of interest a public union
faces whenever it feels tempted to reduce retiree health benefits in
order to enhance benefits for active employees. Usually, this
standard is imposed by state statute. For example, in State ex rel.
City of Wheeling Retirees Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Wheeling, 327 the
court interpreted a West Virginia state labor statute as mandating
328
the same PRHBs level for retirees as for active employees.
Similarly, in Ventura County Retired Employees Ass'n, Inc. v.
County of Ventura,329 a state statute required California public
employers to give preference to health insurance plans that
provided retirees with the same benefits as active employees, at no
increased cost. 330 Finally, in Jones v. Board of Education of the
Watertown City School District,331 the court concluded New York
state law barred any reduction in PRHBs unless a corresponding
diminution of benefits or contributions was applicable to active
332
employees.
V. FINANCING PRHBs IN LIGHT OF
NEW ACCOUNTING RULES
A. How States Currently FinancePRHBs
1. Pay-As-You-Go States
As mentioned earlier, thirty states finance PRHBs on a payas-you-go basis, 333 much like how Social Security benefits are
financed. 334 In other words, current workers are paying for
current retirees. 335 While nothing in the new accounting rules
327. 407 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1991).
328. Id. at 387-88.
329. 279 Cal. Rptr. 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
330. Id. at 678. The California statute at issue did not mandate equal health
care benefits between retirees and active employees, however, only that
preference be given to such plans. Id.
331. 816 N.Y.S.2d 796 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
332. Id. at 970.
333. See Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at 11 (reporting states that

pre-fund PRHBs).
334. See Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security and Government Deficits: When
Should We Worry?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 257, 270 (2007) (describing Social
Security as a "PAYGO," or pay-as-you-go system).

335. Id.
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forces states to switch from pay-as-you-go financing, several
factors will exert pressure on states to increasingly pre-fund
PRHBs: (1) failure to pre-fund may result in a downgrading of a
state's creditworthiness, making it more expensive to borrow
money; 336 (2) the decreasing ratio between the numbers of active
employees to retirees will increase the cost of PRHBs; 337 (3) the
aging workforce 338 and financial incentives to retire at younger
ages 339 will increase the cost of PRHBs; and (4) if recent trends in
the development of medical technology continue, the costs of
healthcare will continue to outstrip inflation for the foreseeable
future. 340 Florida, for example, while generously pre-funding
pension obligations, has set aside virtually no money for PRHBs
estimated to cost $3.6 billion over the next thirty years. 341 While
states have set aside sufficient funds to cover eighty-five percent of
pension liabilities, only three percent of future PRHBs costs have
been pre-funded. 342 None of the five largest states, California,
Texas, New York, Florida, or Illinois has put aside any money for
PRHBs. 343 Several states partially finance PRHBs on a pay-asyou-go basis and partially through pre-funding financing. For
example, Idaho finances its state retirement health care subsidy
on a pay-as-you-go basis, but sick leave insurance conversion is
The same hybrid
pre-funded by employer contributions. 344
financing is in place in New Hampshire. 345 No PRHBs financing is
necessary in Mississippi because health insurance premiums are
fully paid for by retirees. 346 In an about-face, New Jersey switched
from pre-funding financing back to pay-as-you-go in 1994 as a
347
result of a severe budgetary shortfall.
2. Pre-FundingStates
Thirteen states have set up irrevocable trusts to pay for
PRHBs under which none of the funds can be diverted to other
uses. 348 Several states like Arizona 349 and Florida 350 only offer
336. Prah, supra note 26.
337. Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at 22.
338. Health Benefits, supra note 10.
339. See Chisholm, 696 N.W.2d at 333 (holding that the main aim of a
statutory amendment was to authorize public employers to offer PRHBs to
encourage highly compensated employees to retire).
340. Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at 11.
341. Lipman, supra note 130, at 8A.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at app. B at 92 tbl. B2.
345. Id. at app. B at 95 tbl. B2.
346. Id. at app. B at 94 tbl. B2.
347. Id. at app. B at 95 tbl. B2.
348. Prah, supra note 26.
349. Id. at app. B at 90 tbl. B2.
350. Id. at app. B at 91 tbl. B2.
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retirees a healthcare subsidy which is pre-funded by employer
contributions as a percentage of payroll for all active employees.
Seven states 351 : Kentucky, 352 North Dakota, Ohio, 35 3 Oregon,
Virginia, Michigan and Montana finance PRHBs through a wide
array of legal devices. 354 Montana has set up a voluntary
employee benefit association (VEBA) to finance PRHBs and will be
discussed later. 355 Most of the other pre-funding states do so
through employer contributions.3 56 Wisconsin is unique in that its
only retiree health benefit is a program that converts accumulated
sick leave into a lump sum award to retirees which is pre-funded
based on an actuarially determined percentage of payroll. 357 Some
states have issued bonds, much like bonds issued to finance
pension liabilities. 358 This approach is risky if investment returns
are weak, however, because it leaves the public employer dutybound to pay for benefits as well as servicing the debt on the
35 9
bonds.
Between 1985 and 1991, Michigan financed PRHBs through
361
pre-funding. 360 In 1991, however, owing to budgetary problems,
the state reverted to a pay-as-you-go financing system at the
Governor's request. 36 2 Current employees and retirees brought
suit, alleging the state's failure to pre-fund violated the state
constitution which requires that "[f]inancial benefits arising on
account of service rendered in each fiscal year shall be financed
during that year and such funding shall not be used for financing
In Musselman v. Governor
unfunded accrued liabilities." 363
(Musselman 1), the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that PRHBs
were "financial benefits" under the state constitution, and
consequently must be pre-funded just as pension benefits are pre-

351. See Standard & Poor's, U.S. States Are Quantifying OPEB Liabilities
And Developing Funding Strategies As The GASB Deadline Nears, Nov. 12,
2007, at 3-9 available at www.nasra.org/resources/medical/
SandPOPEB0711.pdf (reporting how each state is currently funding its
PRHBs).
352. In 1992, Kentucky was one of only six states that undertook to pre-fund
PRHBs. Bd. of Trustees of Ky. Ret. Sys.'s, 910 S.W.2d at 714.
353. Ohio is one of the few states beginning to manage its PRHBs and
accumulate assets to fund the liability, with about $12 billion in accumulated
assets. Standard & Poor's, supra note 351, at 8.
354. Standard & Poor's, supra note 351, at 3-9.
355. See infra note 388 (describing Montana's VEBA).
356. Standard & Poor's, supra note 351, at 3-9.
357. Wisniewski & Wisniewski, supra note 2, at 10.
358. GAO RETIREE BENEFITS, supra note 34, at 33.
359. Id. at 34.
360. Musselman v. Governor (Musselman 1), 533 N.W.2d 237, 238 (Mich.
1995) rev'd on othergrounds, 545 N.W.2d 346 (1996).
361. Id.
362. Id. at 239.
363. Id. at 240; MICH. CONST., art. 9, § 24 (1963).
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funded. ' 364 Not until the year 2000 did the Michigan Legislature
authorize the pre-funding of PRHBs. 365 The Michigan Supreme
Court settled any confusion left over from Musselman 11 when it
held in 2005 that PRHBs were not constitutionally protected
"financial benefits. 3 66
In 2005, Utah changed its practice of paying retirees a month
of health insurance for every day of unused sick leave. 367 Instead,
wages for each day of unused sick leave will be deposited in retiree
health savings accounts, which retirees can dip into to buy their
366
own health coverage.
B. Innovative FinancingTools369

Public employers may seek to address large, unfunded
PRHBs liabilities through the issuance of taxable bonds much like
pension-obligation bonds. 370 For example, the city of Gainesville,
Florida, issued bonds to finance a $306 million liability in its selfinsured Retiree Healthcare Plan.3 7

1

Some public employers

finance PRHBs through pooled programs known as cost-sharing,
372
multiple employer plans.

Two financing options that are available in both the public
and private sectors are known as Voluntary Employees
Beneficiary Associations (VEBA) and Internal Revenue Code
section 401(h) Accounts.3 7 3 These two financing vehicles share the
following features: (1) both are devices for financing PRHBs 374; (2)

both permit employer contributions to be made on a tax-free
basis375 ; (3) both are trust accounts where assets are administered

in a fiduciary manner and invested to accrue tax-free earnings 376;

364. Id. at 242. As a remedy, however, the Musselman I court made clear
that it lacked the power to force the legislature to appropriate funds. Id. at
245. On rehearing, however, Chief Justice Brickley changed his vote and
decided the case without interpreting the Michigan constitution to include
PRHBs as "financial benefits." Musselman v. Governor (Musselman II), 545
N.W.2d 346, 346-47 (Mich. 1996).
365. MICHIGAN COMMISSION ON PUBLIC PENSION AND RETIREE HEALTH
BENEFITS 13, supra note 133.

366. Studier, 698 N.W.2d at 360.
367. MOODY'S SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
368. Id.
369. See Sheri S. Heffelfinger, Options For FinancingRetiree Health Benefits
Staff Paper #2: VEBAs and 401(h)s, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISABILITY AND
RETIREE HEALTH CARE, (March 2000) (discussing Montana's PRHB outlook
and the options for financing health benefits of public retirees).
370. MOODY'S SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.

371. Id.
372. Id. at 4.
373. Heffelfinger, supra note 369, at 2-4.

374. Id. at 2.
375. Id.
376. Id.
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and (4) both pay PRHBs that are not taxable. 377 Key differences
between these two financing devices are discussed below.
1. Voluntary Employees Beneficiary Associations (VEBA)
VEBAs are created under § 501(c)(9) of the Internal Revenue
Code. 378 Neither the VEBA trust nor the board of trustees may be
under the thumb of an employer or a union and VEBA funds must
be dispersed exclusively for the benefit of eligible VEBA
members.3 7 9 VEBAs may be set up either as a defined benefit plan
or as a defined contribution plan whose benefits may be paid to
active employees, retirees and their families. 380 Finally, VEBAs
38 1
are portable.
Washington State set up a VEBA Medical Expense Plan for
public employees in 1983.382 A trust fund was established that
provides its members with tax-free reimbursement of any medical
expense that is tax-deductible under IRS laws. 383 The plan is
structured as a defined contribution plan with individual member
accounts. 384
Employees manage their individual account
investments and at retirement, unused sick leave is contributed
tax-free to the VEBA trust fund. 385
The plan is entirely
portable. 386 In 2001, Montana set up a VEBA plan under §
501(c)(9) as well, and its contours largely follow its counterpart in
38 7
Washington.
2. Internal Revenue Code section 401(h) Accounts
An Internal Revenue Code section 401(h)388 account is a
qualified annuity plan set up as a defined benefit plan (it is
unclear whether 401(h) plans can be set up as a defined
390
contribution plan 389) that may be tapped tQ pay PRHBs.
Employer contributions are paid into the account tax-free (but it is
unclear if employees may make contributions with pre-tax
377. Id.
378. I.R.C. § 501(c)(9) (2006).
379. Heffelfinger, supra note 369, at 3.
380. Id. at 3-4.
381. Id. at 4.
382. Id. at 5.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 5-6.
386. Id. at 5.
387. See
Montana
VEBA,
http://www.montanaveba.org
(providing
information on the VEBA program for various Montana state employees) (last
visited October 4, 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. 2-18-1302 (2007) (declaring that
the VEBA is being formed to provide a tax-free trust to assist public employees
in paying for health care expenses).

388. I.R.C. § 401(h) (2006).
389. Heffelfinger, supra note 369, at 6.
390. Id.
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dollars). 391 Section 401(h) funds must be separate from pension
392
funds and its assets may not be used for any other purpose.
Unlike VEBAs, 401(h) benefits may only go to retirees, not active
employees. 393 Notably, if a 401(h) plan does not meet IRS
qualification standards, the tax-qualified status of the pension
plan would also fail.3 94 Finally, it is unclear whether the pension
395
plan must be fully funded before a 401(h) plan can be funded.
VI. CONCLUSION

The advent of new accounting rules will highlight the
magnitude of unfunded liabilities facing state and local
governments over the costs of retiree health benefits for current
and former employees. To be sure, other demographic factors are
applying pressure on public employers either to cut back all retiree
benefits or to frame new financing schemes to maintain a strong
credit rating essential for reducing the cost of borrowing money.
An aging population, a decline in the ratio of active workers to
retirees, incentives for highly compensated public employees to
retire early and the rising costs of healthcare generally will
produce a financial nightmare for state and local governments
down the not-to-distant road.
As this article makes clear, efforts to back pedal on promises
of lifetime health care face daunting hurdles where vested benefits
are at stake. Clearly, public employers can reduce or eliminate
retirement benefits for new employees but this will make public
employment less attractive especially if states continue to finance
these benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis. This is so because new
employees will be funding generous benefits for current retirees
fully aware that they will be denied similar benefits when their
turn to retire comes around. Perhaps a new president with the
political will, clout, and skill to enact universal health care will
relieve public employers of some measure of these growing
unfunded liabilities.

391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.

